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Introduction
The standard consensus regarding the subdued level of longer-dated nominal U.S.
Treasury yields on net since the onset of the global financial crisis seems to be that term premiums, rather than anticipated short rates, have been exceptionally low, if not negative for prolonged periods.
1 Depressed term premiums on balance plausibly owe to unconventional Federal Reserve policy, namely large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) that purport to work through the portfolio rebalancing channel under the assumption of market segmentation (Bernanke 2010; Stein, 2012; Gagnon et al., 2011 ), 2 as well as possible net flight-to-quality flows that manifest another aspect of "special demand" or a "safety or scarcity premium" (e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011, 2013) for the asset class.
Nonetheless, two strands of simple evidence raise questions about this story and suggest a wider set of alternative implications for central bankers and investors. First, a purely surveybased measure, without reference to contemporaneous market quotes, suggests that the expected term premium at the 10-year horizon beginning in about five years increased, rather than decreased, on net since the onset of the crisis. Although a corresponding approximate spot measure is more consistent with the consensus, these data suggest that the term premium schedule has steepened, and increased expected forward premiums are perhaps consistent with not only elevated equity risk premium estimates at the time of writing (e.g., Duarte and Rosa, 2013; Durham, 2013c) but perhaps also with more acute flights-to-quality over the crisis episode, as investors plausibly shed not only credit but also duration risk. Second, relevant to the underlying dynamics of affine term structure models (ATSMs), simple "arbitrage-model-free"
1 There is no true gauge of any consensus, but as an example, Bernanke (2010) suggests that contemporary low longer-term yields largely reflect very low term premiums, owing to asset purchases within the context of the portfolio rebalancing channel. 2 However, as Bauer and Rudebusch (2012) argue, conventional monetary policy guidance on the future path of (lower) interest rates might also lower term premiums.
2 econometric analyses of more recent data clearly produce not only a more persistent level of the term structure but also a substantially lower long-run mean, which in turn given the corresponding forecasted slope dynamics and the most recent observation of policy rates near the nominal zero bound, produces an implausibly low expected short rate path today through long horizons. In addition, full parameterizations of ATSMs based on alternative and extended samples, and without any correction for small-sample biases (i.e., Bauer and Rudebusch, 2012) , suggest that more recent data imply meaningfully lower expected short rate paths and concomitantly greater term premiums. This result is perhaps symptomatic of the well-known problem that ATSM parameters are difficult to estimate amid persistent yet ultimately stationary yield series over short samples (e.g., Kim and Orphanides, 2012; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2012) and possibly highlights the prospect that agents learn slowly about possible structural changes that affect underlying model factors (Kozicki and Tinsley, 2001; Laubach et al., 2007; Orphanides and Wei, 2010; Piazzesi et al., 2013) .
Strong caveats with these survey data and econometric analyses as well as challenging theoretical and estimation issues aside, the results suggest broad implications for central bankers and investors. With respect to the former, what follows is not an event study with the objective to isolate the precise channels of LSAPs or (in some cases simultaneously announced) interest rate forward guidance, but rather the subject is the term premium on the risk-free asset class. As such, there is no evaluation of credit, liquidity, mortgage-prepayment, or inflation channels (e.g., Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011 ) of unconventional monetary policy per se. But, a simple and immediate implication of lower anticipated short rates and higher term premiums for central bankers is that perhaps unconventional monetary policy measures to date, including (but not exclusively) LSAPs, have on balance worked to some degree in more conventional ways, 3 namely the signaling as opposed to the portfolio rebalancing channel (e.g., Bauer and Rudebusch, 2012; Woodford, 2012) . With regard to the latter, an inference for investors, who require estimates of expected returns across asset classes for portfolio optimization, is that despite very low levels, longer-dated yields still embed meaningful compensation for bearing duration risk.
Section 2 defines the term premium and discusses the implications of its level. Section 3 describes the survey-based measure of expected forward term premiums, and Section 4 addresses the time-series dynamics of underlying factors in ATSMs. Section 5 concludes with reference to more recent literature on formal term structure models, which in some cases convey sympathy for the view that low long-term yields owe more to expected short rates than the predominant perspective suggests.
The Term Premium: Definitions, Motivations, and Implications
The term premium is the extra compensation investors require to loan to the U.S.
Treasury at a fixed yield for a given period, as opposed to perpetually rolling over the risk-free short rate. For example, the zero-coupon term premium is the spread between the zero-coupon yield to maturity and the average expected short rate over the tenor of the bond, and the forward term premium is the spread between the instantaneous forward rate on a future date and the corresponding anticipated risk-free rate. Indeed, to refer to "the" term premium is as an inadequate and incomplete a description as "the" interest rate with respect to the yield curve.
Prima facie evidence of the very existence of term premiums, and in violation of the pure expectations hypothesis, 3 is the observation that given long samples the U.S. Treasury yield curve has almost always been upward-sloping, whereas investors have not almost always 4 expected increases in the short rate, or in other words, monetary policy tightening cycles. And, informal intuition suggests that investors' perceptions of risks as well as their attitudes toward bearing them affect term premiums. Indeed in more formal terms, simple ATSMs in closed-form imply that term premiums are a function of uncertainty regarding the underlying factors that determine bond yields, possibly including explicitly in very simple models the short rate (i.e., perceptions) and the so-called market prices of risk (i.e., attitudes). Also, some econometric evidence suggests that ATSM-based term premium estimates correlate plausibly with reasonable proxies for both dimensions (e.g., Durham, 2008; Li and Wei, 2012) .
Even so, the term premium is ultimately unobservable, but central bankers as well as investors have strong incentives to make estimates. With respect to the former, effective monetary policy hinges on communication, and therefore central bankers ubiquitously endeavor to extract investors' expectations about, say, inflation and real GDP growth, which in turn requires disentangling expected short rates and term premiums from observed yields. Moreover, some unconventional monetary policy measures in response to the global financial crisis and its aftermath purport to work through the so-called "portfolio rebalancing channel," which assumes market segmentation or preferred habitat and entails a mechanism that runs from reduced term premiums on government bonds (i.e., greater special demand with central bank asset purchases), higher prices for risky assets, and in turn wealth effects and spending. 4 Considering the first link in this chain, the term premium is arguably a policy target (if perhaps not close to a perceived instrument) under this rubric, in no small way like the funds rate under conventional measures.
As such, monetary officials appear to rely increasingly on accurate estimates of term premiums, which again unlike overnight rates such as federal funds are unobservable. Unfortunately, as 5 argued below, estimation may have become much more tenuous, precisely when the need for robust assessments has intensified.
Regarding investors, and in addition to the objective of teasing out expectations, in general active bond market participants estimate the term premium to determine where, both in terms of positions along a given term structure as well as across government bond markets, the tradeoff between duration risk and reward is most favorable. Therefore, term premium estimates serve a similar purpose for bond investors as the equity risk premium does for stock market participants. Just as bond investors endeavor to select points on the term structure that pay the most for any given duration exposure, international equity investors allocate toward markets with the greatest expected return (relative to the risk-free asset), all else equal. Another plausible analogy is the CAPM, as investors with strong conviction on the underlying (positive) direction of the stock market would invest in high-beta shares, ceteris paribus. But in even more general terms, expected returns are required for asset allocation and optimization (e.g., Ilmanen, 2011) , and therefore estimates, perhaps preferably simultaneous calculations (e.g., Lemke and Werner, 2009; Durham, 2013c demand," on balance, including bouts of flight-to-safety as well as, again, unconventional policy measures designed to lower term premiums (e.g., Bernanke, 2010) , perhaps through not only outright purchases and a supply channel but also through possible reductions in policy uncertainty. 5 Going forward, the implication for central bankers is perhaps that measures such as large scale asset purchases (LSAPs), the first link in the portfolio rebalancing channel, have to date "worked" reasonably satisfactorily, or perhaps exhaustively so given some possible limits to lowering negative term premiums as opposed to anticipated short rates any further (e.g., Stein, 2012; Kiley, 2012) . For investors, the implication of low term premiums, again hypothetically just as for depressed equity premiums, is primarily lower anticipated returns on the asset class, perhaps arguably for those sections of the term structure in particular where Federal Reserve purchases have been more pronounced.
Yet for the sake of argument, and remembering that the term premium is ultimately unobservable, what would the implications be for central bankers and investors if the term premium were not so low, or if the decline in yields also owed to subdued anticipated short rates? In hindsight with respect to the financial crisis, the flight-to-safety could have been more acute, assuming a less pronounced decline in longer-dated term premiums. 6 After all, with sharp increases in perceptions and attitudes toward risk, writ large, term premiums conceivably rise with the severity of perceived financial conditions, as investors shed not only credit but also 7 duration risk in a panic. 7 Also, to reflect on recent policy innovations, unconventional measures may still have worked, but ironically perhaps in more conventional ways, as balance sheet tools might prove somewhat more fungible than the portfolio rebalancing channel implies (e.g., Woodford, 2012) . Indeed, given some adjustments for small-sample bias and statistical uncertainty, Bauer and Rudebusch (2012) find, using an event-study approach similar to Gagnon et al. (2011) but notably without using term premium estimates based on Kim and Wright (2005) , that LSAPs purchases had significant signaling effects on the anticipated path of short rates.
For investors, to the extent that term premiums are indeed greater, recent low yields would still embed meaningful compensation for risk, as expected returns on longer duration positions are greater than otherwise, not unlike an exogenous increase in equity risk premiums.
Similarly, required returns on government bonds, and possibly those issued in countries that have pursued more expansive central bank balance sheet policies, might be comparatively greater, all else equal. There are perhaps also substantial implications for curve as opposed to active duration positions depending on the (re)configuration of forward instantaneous term premiums.
As a plausible example, to the extent that forward term premiums in the belly of the U.S. yield curve are greater than the consensus models suggests, expected returns to bulleted portfolios, again irrespective of duration, would be greater.
Some (Forward and Approximate Spot) Survey Evidence on the Term Premium
Given these profound, if not somewhat conflicting, implications of the decomposition of the term structure for central bankers as well as investors, some rudimentary analyses of the particular impact of recent data on estimation seem warranted. To start, there are at least two 8 general approaches to estimate the extra compensation investors require for lending to the U.S.
Treasury over longer as opposed to shorter periods. One approach is to use surveys, and another is to use formal term structure models (e.g., Kim and Wright, 2005) . with the view that investors today would expect that their counterparts, even a millennium into the future, would demand some compensation for rolling over shorter-term debt to the U.S.
Treasury, presumed to be at the constant equilibrium rate between 1000 and 1010 years ahead.
The gap in these long-run forecasts might approximate anticipated term premiums at that horizon. years. As such, these forecasts might not reflect equilibrium levels but rather lingering projections from a prolonged if not unprecedented interest rate cycle, such as the period following the recent financial crisis. Then again, many respondents might ignore the explicit horizon, and, as in the SEP, render their "equilibrium" estimates for interest rates beyond the current cycle.
There is no way to know for sure, but these survey data do not seem to imply this latter assumption that longer-run forecast embed information about perceived equilibriums. In addition to the average between six and 10 years ahead, the BCFF includes forecasts for the federal funds rate (and at least seven other nominal Treasury yield tenors) for each year between one and five years hence. The identifying assumption that the 6-through 10-year average forecasts (for any series) approximate an equilibrium expectation implies that projections asymptote to long-run levels by the end of the nearer term, i.e., the 1-to 5-year horizon that captures prevailing perceptions about the trajectory of the current business cycle. If the mean forecast for the federal funds rate for the fifth year is equal to the average forecast for the sixth through the tenth year, then a reasonable inference is that respondents expect no cyclical developments in policy after the fifth year, and thus the longest-horizon forecast indeed closely resembles an equilibrium projection. For example, in the most recent BCFF forecast (June 11 2013), the mean expected funds rate forecasts were 0.8 percent, 2.0 percent, 3.1 percent, 3.6 percent, and 3.9 percent for calendar years 2015 through 2019, respectively-a steady exit from the nominal zero bound. However, perhaps tellingly, the average forecast for the subsequent period from 2020 through 2014 was 3.8 percent, strictly speaking 10 basis points lower than the 2019 projection and implies that respondents did not necessarily envisage further tightening or "normalization" beyond five years and, in turn, thus rendered an equilibrium funds rate for the Indeed, the most notable distinction is that while the forward measure is, again, elevated from 2007, the spot estimate nudges lower-largely consistent with the consensus, at least on net given the last three surveys or so (although not as coincident with the initial rounds of LSAPs).
As such, the survey evidence is ambiguous regarding the last few years.
Before making further inferences, some further consideration of the validity of the measures seems warranted. As with any "model-free" estimate, the survey-based forward term premium rests on strong simplifying assumptions, however persuasive the simple evidence in Exhibit 1. Also, neither the forward nor spot estimates impose any arbitrage-free structure.
Nonetheless, some additional survey data might address whether there is any intuition behind these results. As noted previously, closed-form affine model solutions suggest that the partial derivative of term premiums with respect to the volatility parameters is positive. In other words, investors demand greater compensation to hold longer-term debt, the greater their uncertainty about the trajectory of short-term rates over the horizon. Briefly, the very surveys that produce these term premium estimates include some relevant information on this score. Both the BCFF and BCEI surveys report not only the mean responses for the 6-through 10-year horizons but also the difference between the top and bottom ten answers for each U.S. Treasury maturity point, as well as for the federal funds rate. This range in responses strictly reflects disagreement rather than uncertainty per se, but a worthwhile question is whether the magnitude of the range of anticipated policy rates between six and 10 years ahead correlates with the implied term premium measure at that horizon.
Exhibit 5 shows simple scatter plots of the forward and approximate spot term premium estimates for each of the 32 surveys, against the difference between the top average and bottom average responses for the federal funds rate. Regarding the forward measure, indicated in the top panel, visual inspection suggests a positive relation between the proxy for long-run uncertainty about policy (perceptions rather than attitudes toward risk) and long-run duration compensation, as expected. Even though the limited number of observations hardly affords satisfactory statistical power, the p value (0.000) nonetheless indicates significance well within standard confidence bands, and the R-squared of the simple OLS regression is almost 0.40. 14 Also, the slope (0.59) seems economically meaningful, and as such this survey evidence is scarcely inconsistent with intuition and formal theory. By contrast, although the evidence on the approximate spot measure in the lower panel indicates the same general relation, the estimates are notably weaker considering a lower R-squared (0.08), a lower slope (0.36), and a p value (0.113) that suggests statistical insignificance, albeit again given few observations. As a further caveat any inference that the forward measure follows intuition whereas the spot metric does not, the remaining unexplained variance likely owes to the fundamental under-specification of the univariate model, particularly the absence of any proxy for the market price of risk, which in theory might not perhaps relate to flights-to-quality per se during the latter sample period but special demand associated with asset purchases.
There are a number of standard caveats regarding the use of survey data, including small cross-sections and inconsistent samples over time as well as possible "irrational" forecasts (e.g., Froot, 1989) . 15 Nonetheless, in sum these survey data might contain some useful information about investors' longer-run perceptions of duration risk, and the fact that the forward metric has on net increased rather than decreased since the onset of the financial crisis is noteworthy. Also, considering both measures, a complicated story-perhaps related to the transmission of unconventional monetary policy through supply or signaling channels-must reconcile investors' increased perceptions of anticipated interest rate risk on 10-year yields beginning in six years, with simultaneously decreased spot term premiums for that tenor. A possible explanation is that, just as term premiums mean revert by construction in common Gaussian affine term structure models (e.g., Kim and Wright, 2005) , the survey data similarly imply a steep expected trajectory from low spot premiums toward historical norms, or perhaps elevated levels around the 5-year horizon that could be consistent with some unmooring of investors' perceptions of the Federal Reserve's reaction function or perhaps concern about the long-run implications of unconventional balance sheet measures.
As a segue into ATSMs, Kim and Orphanides (2005) demonstrate some key advantages in using survey data to pin down the expected short rate path, in the particular context of short samples and persistent interest rate series. 16 However, their estimations only use forecasts of the 3-month bill rate and no other longer-dated tenor from the BCFF or BCEI surveys.
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15 Froot (1989) infers using survey data that the failure of the expectations hypothesis for long bonds owes to expectation errors. Also, Bacchetta et al. (2009) find across multiple financial markets that expectation errors from surveys are predictable in markets with significant excess return predictability (i.e., in foreign exchange, stock, and bond markets but not the money market). However, the use of survey data in this application differs because, although long-run forecasts of each maturity may be biased or prove erroneous, this term premium proxy of course comprises the spread(s) between those projections. 16 However, Bauer and Rudebusch (2012) argue that information from surveys does not satisfactorily address smallsample bias given their low frequency and possible misrepresentation of rational short rate forecasts. 17 Kim and Orphanides (2012) compare monthly Blue Chip near-term forecasts of 5-and 10-year yields with those based on their forecasts. They do not use distant-horizon forecasts of longer-dated tenors in their Kalman-filterbased maximum likelihood estimates. Some previous estimations incorporate long-run survey forecasts of longerdated tenors for non-U.S. data. For example, Guimarães (2012) , who finds that contemporary low U.K. 10-year government bond yields owes to lower expected real rates (rather than real or inflation risk premiums) uses Unfortunately, these forecasts are only available twice a year, but an alternative nonetheless might be to feed the Kalman filter estimation survey data evenly across the term structure.
Given the results in Exhibit 3, a sensible prior might be that these survey data might push term premium (expected short rate) estimates across the yield curve somewhat higher (lower). But, as the next section suggests, such a more comprehensive combination of survey and financial data is not necessarily required to raise some questions about model-based estimates of exceptionally low Treasury term premiums given more recent data.
Some Evidence Germane to Affine Term Structure Models
As an alternative to the expectations hypothesis, ATSMs afford closed-form expressions anywhere along the yield curve for time-varying term premiums, which formally comprise the difference between model-implied forward rates (yields) and the model-implied (average) expected short rates. 18 However, a well-known problem with estimation regards the high persistence yet presumed mean-reversion of bond yields given short samples (Kim and Orphanides, 2012; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2012) , which naturally raises the specter of sensitivity to sample extensions. Other empirical challenges include possible peso problems (Gürkaynak and Wright, 2012) , and some research also explores bond pricing with learning, as agents slowly recognize regime shifts (Kozicki and Tinsley, 2001) or form expectations in a manner that is decidedly more evolutionary than standard models imply (with common constant mean and conditional volatilities for economic variables) (Laubach et al., 2007; Orphanides and Wei, 2010) . None of what follows represents any attempt to make progress on these estimation issues, Consensus Economics forecasts of average 5-year inflation five years ahead in addition to 1-, 2-, and 3-year-ahead forecasts of the policy rate. 18 The author is no less guilty of pushing standard ATSMs to make inferences on the conundrum, (Durham, 2008) , the discount factor in dividend discount models (Durham, 2013a) , and the European sovereign debt crisis (Durham, 2013b) .
but for the purposes of immediate policy and investment inferences, some very simple analyses highlight these challenges and question the common consensus on very low term premiums.
To review some necessary rudiments, just as for longer-dated yields, the expected riskless instantaneous short rate, r, at some -period interval beyond time t, is an affine function of the underlying factors, as in
where 0  is a scalar, and 1  is an 1 n  vector, and X is an 1 n  vector of state variables, which in applications are wholly observable (Li and Wei, 2012) , purely latent (Kim and Wright, 2005) , or some combination thereof (Ang and Piazzesi, 2003; Lemke and Werner, 2009; Joyce et al., 2009 ). An observable approach may have particular theoretical appeal for researchers at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance, especially if the factors are truly exogenous to the term structure, perhaps akin to a policy rule framework for expected short rates. Indeed, (2) nests simple econometric expressions of the Taylor rule, and accordingly active views among investors regarding, say, expected inflation or the output gap from t to t +  , might plausibly form the basis for    t EX through any horizon.
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However, even studies that incorporate macroeconomic variables readily acknowledge that additional factors are required to fit the term structure with satisfactory precision (e.g., Ang and Piazzesi, 2003; Ang et al., 2006) . If the data were not as discouraging, exogenous macroeconomic factors might exclusively comprise X, instead of the common addition of the first few principal components of the term structure. Regardless, by construction any inference about expected short rates, and in turn term premiums, based on (2) embeds the assumption that
represents the market consensus on each macroeconomic variable or principal
where a is an 1 n  vector,  is an nn  matrix,
 is an nn  matrix, and  is an But again, under the standard observable-factor approach, a simple VAR or set of OLS regressions typically determines these time-series parameters, and the expected state vector, in turn projected from each point in the sample, follows from the simple recursive solution for the expectation of (3), as in
Note that the discussion thus far has not covered the full set of ATSM estimates, particularly the market prices of risk and the volatility parameters. Nonetheless, some "arbitrage-model-free"
analyses of time-series dynamics might be instructive regarding the level of expected short rates.
Indeed, alternative estimates of (3) show how sensitive the key time-series parameters are to sample selection, namely more recent data. Exhibit 6 summarizes the results from simple OLS regressions under the assumption that the level, using the 5-year yield as the proxy, and the slope of the term structure, measured as the spread between the 5-year yield and the 3-month bill rate (e.g., as in Li and Wei, 2012) , are exclusive functions of one-period lags in both factors.
The sensitivity analysis comprises 74 alternative monthly regressions, given data starting in July 1993 and alternatively ending in July 2007 (i.e., the sample end date from Li and Wei, 2012) through May 2013. True, these samples are short and subject to potential bias, but nevertheless longer than previous studies such as Kim and Orphanides (2012, as well as studies cited within), Kim and Wright (2005) , and several others. To focus on the level factor, the corresponding element of -the mean reversion parameter-implies greater persistence with additional data, as noted by the dashed line and with respect to the right axis. In addition, the implied long-run along with the corresponding projection of the slope, the dashed line, by construction produces the implied 3-month rate forecast, a close approximation of "the short rate," denoted by the red line. 22 The implied expected bill rate does not increase until the 1-year horizon, and the level appears to asymptote to between 3 and 3.5 percent by the 10-year horizon-a trajectory not too dissimilar from contemporary implied paths derived from complete ATSMs, as noted below.
But, the corresponding projection of the anticipated bill rate in the lower panel of Exhibit 7, given the greater persistence and lower mean derived from the full sample, is quite different, to stay the least. The path is impossibly negative throughout the 10-year forecast horizon, and projected rates rebound about three years later compared to the estimate based on the truncated sample. To be sure, this implied-trajectory for short rates is implausibly low, but this simplistic application nonetheless raises some questions about the time-series dynamics, particularly the persistence and long-run mean of the level factor using the most recent data. Again, these tacit inferences are not based on a full affine model parameterization or direct term premium estimates, but these results do represent the "first step" in the common "two-step" estimation with observable factors (e.g., Ang and Piazzesi, 2003) and ultimately suggest low anticipated short rates rather than low term premiums.
What do full ATSM parameterizations say, after all, with and without more recent data?
The solid black line in Exhibit 8 shows the term premium on 10-year yields based on a 3-latentfactor Vasicek model estimated (without survey information) using data from April 1991 through July 2008. Indeed, consistent with the general consensus, the estimated term premium toward the end of the sample is extremely low in absolute terms. Similarly, the Kim-Wright term premium, the dashed line, is exceptionally low for the latest available data point. To gauge the correction for small-sample bias (e.g., Bauer and Rudebusch, 2012) , also raises some questions regarding the prevailing view on exceptionally low term premiums in the current environment. 
Discussion
Central bankers and some investors increasingly depend on accurate decompositions of the yield curve, unfortunately precisely when term premium estimation is especially difficult.
Short samples and slow mean version present formidable problems for ATSM parameter estimation, even given pre-2008 data, not to mention the timely reality of the nominal zero bound for interest rates, which modern extensions and applications of Vasicek (1977) cannot fully incorporate. Greater skepticism regarding formal tools for extracting monetary policy expectations from recent yields, and in turn increased reliance on model-free metrics, indeed could be forgiven. With respect to investors, and perhaps similar to shortcomings in the CAPM or some equity risk premium estimates, model-free anomalies along the term structure, including persistent momentum patterns both within and across government bond markets (Durham, 2013d; Asness et al., 2013) , could provide alternative signals regarding required duration compensation that ATSM-based term premium estimates fail to identify.
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Without any claim toward remote progress on estimation issues, the preceding analyses of a survey-based forward term premium proxy, simple econometric analysis of the time-series dynamics of the level of the term structure, and sample extensions of simple but fullyparameterized ATSMs raise questions regarding the very-low-term-premium consensus. As such, the broader findings are consistent with Bauer and Rudebusch (2012) , whose event-study analyses of small-sample-bias-corrected premiums also suggest that unconventional policy measures also had important signaling effects, as distinct from the portfolio rebalancing channel or perhaps other narrower channels. An implication perhaps implies a shift in monetary policy from any pretense of harnessing the portfolio rebalancing channel toward further forward rate guidance. Then again, another plausible inference is that LSAPs have not gone far enough, as central banks have room to push term premiums lower, perhaps even through explicit targets for longer-dated yields that would in turn expose central bank balance sheets to even greater expansion. For investors, the implications are comparatively straightforward yet profoundhigher term premiums imply greater expected returns from longer-duration positions, as the upward slope of the yield curve does not necessarily embed significant anticipated capital depreciation on government bonds. At the very least, these results suggest future work on incorporating parameter instability and therefore learning into term structure models, along the lines of Orphanides and Wei (2010) perhaps, but with an extension of their sample beyond 2006, 25 as well as Laubach et at. (2007) or Kozicki and Tinsley (2001) .
Without an exhaustive meta-analysis, a quick survey of more recent innovations in term structure modeling is instructive. Besides Bauer and Rudebusch (2012) , some other studies are not inconsistent with increased sympathy for the view that expected short rates might also be low around the time of writing. 26 For example, Guimarães (2012) in fact finds that the recent postcrisis net decline in nominal Gilt yields, notably amid experience with unconventional Bank of England policy, comprises lower expected real rates as opposed to real term premiums, inflation risk premiums, or anticipated inflation. Also, models that simultaneously estimate the Treasury term and equity risk premium tend to produce somewhat greater term premiums than, say, the Kim-Wright (2005) model over similar pre-crisis samples (e.g., Lemke and Werner, 2009 ).
These models as well as other approaches (e.g., Duarte and Rosa, 2012) suggest that the equity risk premium is now elevated, which is inconsistent with the view that the portfolio rebalancing channel has satisfactorily transpired, counterfactuals aside. And notably, extensions of the sample broadly indicate that these arbitrage-free estimates of the equity premium are robust, but term premiums are as sensitive as the preceding analyses suggest (Durham, 2013c) .
